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I. INTRODUCTION
The Major Projects Arrangements' (MPA) have been hailed as a significant step in
penetrating Japan's construction market, which is the second largest market in the world for
public construction projects.2 However, the condition of the Japanese infrastructure lags far
behind that of the U.S. and Europe.' It is estimated that the Japanese will invest 6.6 trillion
dollars to update and maintain their infrastructure system.4 Consequently, American
contractors have much to gain by penetrating Japan's flourishing construction market.5
In 1986, with the news of the Kansai International Airport Project (KIAP), U.S. interest
in the traditionally closed Japanese construction market became a political issue of
1. Major Projects Arrangements, July 31,1991, U.S.-Japan, U.S. Department of Commerce (on file with
the U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of General Counsel) [hereinafter MPA].
2. Japan: Some Progress Made In U.S.- Japan Talks On Construction, Another Meeting Likely, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 504 (1991) [hereinafter Japan Talks]; Japan's Edge on U.S. Widens, ENGINEERING NEWS-
RECORD, Sept. 20, 1990, at 16.
3. FuMIo HASEGAWA & THE SHIMIZU GROUP FS, BUILT BY JAPAN: COMPETITIvE STRATEmEs OF THE
JAPANESE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 195 (1988).
4. I.
5. Id.; Japan: U.S. Seeks Access To 35 Additional Major Japanese Construction Projects, 9 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1377 (1992) [hereinafter Additional Projects].
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heightened proportions.' Officials anticipated that the KIAP would produce 6.7 billion
dollars in construction contracts! However, American contractors knew that they could not
successfully bid on the KIAP due to Japan's restrictive bidding requirements.8 As a result,
the U.S. began bilateral trade negotiations with Japan aimed at providing American
contractors a real opportunity to compete for the KIAP contracts.9
On May 25, 1988, Secretary of Commerce C. William Verity, and Japanese
Ambassador to the U.S. Nobuo Matsunaga, exchanged a group of letters which memorialized
the KIAP negotiations."0 These letters created what became known as the 1988 Major
Projects Arrangemrnts (1988 MPA), which purported to set forth a program whereby Japan
would pursue nondiscriminatory procurement policies relating to their public works
projects." The 1988 MPA was revised on July 31, 1991 and became known as the 1991
Major Projects Arrangements (PIA). 12
Part H of this Comment sets forth the historical background and evolution of the
MPA.' 3 Part I discusses the goals, purposes and important provisions of the MPA, and
how they impact Japan's current construction market. 4 Part IV examines the legality of
the MPA, and possible solutions to creating a free system of trade for construction services
between the U.S. and Japan. 5 Part V analyzes the viability of utilizing the MPA as a
bridge to creating a multilateral agreement under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) for the free trade of construction services in the international construction
industry. 6 Finally, the conclusion reviews the progress made as a result of the MPA in
penetrating the Japanese construction market.
7
6. ELLIs S. KRAUSS, UNDER CONSTRUCTION: U.S.-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS To OPEN JAPAN'S
CONSTRUCTION MARKErs To AMERIcAN FIRMS, 1985-1988 6-7 (1988); Japan: Smart Satisfied With Talks As
Progress Seen On Tabasco Trade, Airport Construction, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1076 (1986) [hereinafter
Smart]; SIDNEY M. Lvv, JAPANESE CONSTRUCTION: AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 389 (1990).
7. LEVYYsupra note 6, at 389-91. The KIAP is situated on a 1262-acre man-made island. Id. The island
is three miles offshore from Izuisano City on Osaka Bay. lal When completed, it will have the capacity to
service 190,000 passengers daily. Id.
8. Id.
9. Smart, supra note 6, at 1076. See infra notes 68-90 and accompanying text (discussing Japan's
restrictive bidding requirements).
10. KRAUSS, supra note 6, at 35; Japan: U.S., Japan Sign Letters ofAgreement Aimed at Opening Up
Japanese Construction Market, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 783 (1988) [hereinafter Letters]; HASEGAWA & THE
SHIMIZU GROUP FS, supra note 3, at 195.
11. Letters, supra note 10, at 783; HASEGAWA & THE SHIMIZU GROUP FS, supra note 3, at 195.
12. Japan: U.S., Japan Sign New Agreement To Increase Access To Construction Market, 8 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1171 (1991) [hereinafter New Agreement]. The 1991 MPA built on the 1988 agreement by
providing, among other things, for more transparency in Japanese bidding procedures, a simplified ranking
system for frms to be designated eligible to bid on projects, and an independent procurement review board to
handle complaints. Id.
13. See infra notes 18-67 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 68-148 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 149-59 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 160-72 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE MPA
In 1986, news of the KIAP spurred U.S. officials into bilateral negotiations with Japan
in an effort to open the Japanese construction market to U.S. construction companies.18
U.S. and Japanese officials reached an agreement in which the Kansai International Airport
Company promised to implement fair and nondiscriminatory procurement practices, as well
as ensure that proper and timely information on procurement be supplied to U.S. construction
fins.19 Further, Japanese officials stated that they would ensure that project owners would
provide fair and equal opportunities for foreign firms engaged in bidding on the KIAP.2"
By early 1987,U.S. officials were angered by the lack of progress U.S. contractors were
making in securing KIAP contracts.2 U.S. officials threatened to retaliate if Japan did not
comply with the agreement.22 The U.S. and Japan attempted to resolve disputes over U.S.
construction finns participating in Japan's construction market, but the negotiations broke
off in November 1987.23 Consequently, U.S. officials began to take retaliatory
measures2 By January 1988, as the result of continued activity in the House and Senate
by House Government Operations Committee Chairman Jack Brooks and Senator Frank
Murkowski, a U.S. budget law resolution, known as the "Brooks-Murkowski
Amendment, " 's barred Japan from participating in any construction projects funded in
whole or in part by the U.S. government during the 1988 fiscal year.26
18. Smart, supra note 6, at 1076.
19. Id. The Kansai International Airport Company also indicated that it would hold seminars for U.S.
contractors to familiarize them with the bidding process. Id&
20. Id.
21. Japan: Rudman Weighing Measure To Ban Japanese Construction Companies From U.S. Market,
4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 304 (1987) [hereinafter Rudman]. Senator Warren Rudman (R-N.H.) threatened to
introduce legislation that would ban all Japanese construction firms from the U.S. market unless the Japanese
accorded reciprocal access to Japan's market. li Further, Senator Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska) accused Japan
of "stonewalling" U.S. negotiating efforts. Id
22. KRAuss, supra note 6, at 21; Rudman, supra note 21 at 304.
23. Japan: Kansai Talks With U.S. Officials Break Off, Administration Weighs Section 301 Retaliation,
4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1379 (1987).
24. Japan: Senate Okays Defense Bill Measure Hitting Japanese Construction Bidding Practices, 4 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1183 (1987) [hereinafter Defense Bill; Japan: House Okays Measure To Bar Japanese Firms
From U.S. Public Works Construction Market, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1526 (1987) [hereinafter Bar].
25. LEVY, supra note 6, at 24-25.
26. Japan: U.S. Budget Law Barring Construction Firms From Public Works Projects Hits Only Japan,
5 Int'l Trade Rep. (ENA) 48 (1988). President Reagan signed the budget law (Pub. L. No. 100-202) on
December 22, 1987. Id. The resolution, named the "Brooks-Murkowski Amendment" after its sponsors,
Representative Jack Brooks (D-Tex.) and Senator Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska), put Japan on a list of countries
that maintain unfair trade barriers to U.S. construction products and goods. Id The U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR) maintains the list and will only remove Japan from the list after Japan lifts its trade barriers against U.S.
contractors and submits to the President of the USTR evidence that such barriers have been removed. Id The
USTR is required to investigate and verify that the trade barriers have been removed and submit such findings
to the House and Senate 30 days before lifting the restriction. Id The resolution bars the use of funds for "any
contract for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public building or public work in the United States or
any territory or possession of the United States with any contractor or subcontractor of a foreign country, or any
supplier of products of a foreign country, during any period in which such foreign country is listed by the United
States Trade Representative... ." Japan; Administration, Japan Resumes Negotiations on U.S. Access to
Construction markets, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 398 (1988) [hereinafter Japan Resumes]; Defense Bil supra
note 24, at 1183; Bar, supra note 24, at 1526.
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Negotiations began again in late January 1988 but ended in a stalemate on February 20
when U.S. officials rejected a severely limited Japanese offer to open a small portion of its
construction market.27 Consequently, members of Congress have continued to push for
investigation of Japan's construction trade practices pursuant to section 30128 of the Trade
Act of 1974,29 as amended." If such an investigation was initiated and discriminatory
practices found under section 301, the U.S., at the discretion of President Reagan, could have
imposed trade sanctions against Japan.31 Fearing the possibility of a section 301 action,
Japan vigorously resumed negotiations in late March 1988.32 Anticipating a resolution, the
Economic Policy Council postponed its section 301 investigation until further negotiations
were completed.33
On March 29, 1988, U.S. and Japanese officials reached a last-minute accord of a
framework designed to enable U.S. firms greater access to certain major Japanese
construction projects.' On May 25, 1988, the 1988 MPA was formalized when Commerce
Secretary Verity and Japanese Ambassador Matsunaga signed letters of agreement aimed at
opening Japan's construction market to U.S. firms." The agreement offered U.S. firms the
opportunity to bid on seven major public works projects valued at 17 billion dollars.36
Commerce Secretary Verity stated that "[t]he goal of these special arrangements will be to
get enough contracts, for enough American construction companies, on enough different
kinds of projects, so that they will have the Japanese experience they need to work on other
Japanese government projects in the future.""
27. Japan: Latest Japanese Offer To Open Construction Markets Rejected By U.S. Officials In Tokyo,
5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 234 (1988). Japan offered to open six Japanese public works projects to bidding by
foreign contractors. Id. However, the offer excluded those portions of the projects in which U.S. firms would
be most competitive. Id. Official reports stated that such a list could not be accepted because it simply does not
allow U.S. firms to compete. Id.
28. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618 § 301, 88 Stat. (Jan. 3, 1975). "Section 301 authorizes, and
in some cases requires, the United States to impose trade sanctions against foreign countries that violate trade
agreements or engage in unfair trade practices. Its primary objective is to provide the United States with the
necessary leverage to negotiate satisfactory agreements with foreign countries, in order to resolve trade disputes
and to open foreign markets to U.S. firms." Jean H. Grier, The Use of Section 301 to Open Japanese Markets
to Foreign Firms, 17 N. C. J. IN'L & COM. REo. 1, 2 (1992).
29. KRArUss, supra note 6, at 32; Japan: Section 301 Complaint Against Construction: Barriers
Recommended By Sub-Cabinet Group, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 277 (1988). The latest recommendation to
proceed with a section 301 investigation was made by the sub-Cabinet-level Trade Policy Review Group which
unanimously made the recommendation to the Economic Policy Council. Id.
30. Trade Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39 § 901, 93 Stat. 295 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)).
31. Id.
32. Japan Resumes, supra note 26, at 398.
33. Id. As talks reopened, Commerce Secretary C. William Verity was quick to stress the U.S. goals. Id.
Secretary Verity stated "[]his means that [Japan] ... would identify specific, concrete business opportunities.
They would be open with fully transparent, competitive procedures like those we are negotiating for the Kansai
airport, applying public, private, and third-sector components of these major public works." I&a
34. Steven J. Dryden, Accord Reached on U.S. Access to 14 Major Projects in Japan, ENOINEMINO
NEws REcoRD, April 7, 1988, at 12; Japan: U.S., Japan Reach Last-Minute Accord Opening Japanese
Construction Market To U.S. Firms, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 450 (1988) [hereinafter Accord Reached].
35. KRAUSS, supra note 6, at 35; Accord Reached, supra note 34, at 450.
36. Id. U.S. Trade Representative Michael Smith emphasized that the agreement was bilateral and
negotiated for the benefit of the U.S. Id. However, it became clearly apparent that other countries would benefit
as well when four major Korean contractors received licenses shortly after the agreement was made. See LEVY,
supra note 6, at 388-89.
37. Letters, supra note 10, at 783.
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Although the agreement was hailed as a substantial first step, not all were optinistic.38
The International Engineering and Construction Industries Council (IECIC), representing
U.S. engineers, contractors, and architects, stated that the agreement "consists of procedural
reforms only and does not address the formidable industry and cultural barriers which have
contributed to precluding American firms from entering the design and construction
market."39 The IECIC continued to advocate that the only way to effectively break into the
Japanese construction market is through a section 301 investigation, or, at the very least,
through monitoring of the agreement by a formal congressional conmmittee."
In fact, the 1988 MPA got off to a difficult start' On November 21, 1988, the office
of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) initiated an investigation against Japan
under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.42 In support of the investigation, the IECIC
submitted a statement to the USTR indicating that U.S. design and construction firms were
precluded from entering the Japanese construction market, and requested a public hearing
to voice its concerns.43 As the threat of section 301 trade sanctions became a reality,44 and
the disparity between the U.S. and Japanese construction markets grew, U.S. and Japanese
officials resumed their negotiations in an effort to improve the 1988 MA.45
With negotiations progressing, the USTR decided not to employ trade sanctions against
Japan under section 301.46 But USTR officials made it clear that they felt that Japan was
still engaging in discriminatory practices aimed at making it difficult for U.S. firms to
participate in the Japanese construction market.47 As such, May 25, 1990, which marked
the second anniversary of the 1988 MPA, became the new deadline for retaliatory action
under section 301.4
38. Id
39. d
40. Id
41. Japan: USTR Initiates Unfair Trade Investigation Against Japan's Barriers to U.S. Builders, 5 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1523, 1524 (1988).
42. Id. The investigation was mandated by the Trade Act of 1988. Id. The investigation resulted from
complaints by U.S. firms of continued difficulty, despite the 1988 MPA, in penetrating the Japanese
construction market. Id
43. Japan: U.S. Builders Tell USTR They are Barred From Japanese Design, Construction Market, 6 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 11 (1989) [hereinafter Design]. In its statement, the IECIC argued that Japanese government
barriers shut the doors to U.S. construction fims while Japanese firms enjoy free access to the U.S. market. Id
In support of this statement, the IECIC provided statistics which showed that the Japanese market share in the
U.S. construction industry shot up from 50 million dollars in 1982 to 2.2 billion dollars in 1987. Id On the other
hand, U.S. firms have spent more money trying to break into the Japanese construction market than they have
received in contracts. Id.
44. Japan: U.S. Acknowledges Some Japanese Progress, But Construction Talks Yield Little Else, 6 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1476 (1989). U.S. officials had until November 21, 1989 to decide whether to assess trade
sanctions against Japan for violations of section 301. Id However, U.S. officials stated that such retaliatory
measures would not be instigated if a satisfactory agreement came out of the negotiations. Id
45. Design, supra note 43, at 11. The U.S. maintains that the 1988 MPA had failed to meet its objectives.
Id
46. Japan: U.S. Delays Retaliation Against Japan's Alleged Barriers to U.S. Construction Firms, 6 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1548 (1989).
47. Id U.S. officials considered the following Japanese practices to be unreasonable: 1) inadequate
measures to deter collusive bidding practices; 2) limitations on the designated bidder system, which promotes
bid-rigging; 3) the exclusion of foreign firms from public projects unless they have prior experience in Japan;
and 4) discrimination in providing project information to foreign firms. Id
48. Id Although the U.S. construction industry felt that postponing retaliation under section 301 was soft,
officials were optimistic that the move would revitalize current negotiations. Id
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In response to -the suspension of plans to retaliate, Japanese officials implemented new
measures aimed at banning bid-rigging in public works projects.49 As talks continued,
Senator Frank Murkowski presented another amendment (Murkowski Amendment) which
would bar Japanese construction firms from participating in U.S. public works projects."
Senator Murkowski proposed the amendment largely to protest the Japanese government's
decision to award the first major contract of the KIAP-the people mover (automated
sidewalk) contract-to a Japanese contractor with little experience in the construction of
people movers overAfEG Westinghouse Transportation Systems, Inc., which had constructed
fourteen of the eighteen people movers in operation at airports worldwide. 51 Additionally,
as in 1988, Senator Murkowski intended to use the proposed amendment as leverage to
motivate Japan to commit to genuine reform of its construction industry.52
USTR officials set May 1, 1991 as the deadline for completing the review of the 1988
MPA 3 In order to avoid implementation of the Murkowski Amendment and section 301
sanctions, it was necessary for the Japanese construction market to be open to U.S.
contractors by the deadline.54 Specifically, Japan needed to make more projects applicable
to the 1988 MPA,' 5 as well as make their bidding procedures more transparent. 6 With
the impending formulation of section 301 sanctions, U.S. and Japanese negotiators reached
an agreement on June 1, 1991, which more than doubled the applicable projects under the
1988 MPA.57 Although U.S. and Japanese negotiators were deadlocked, Japanese Prime
Minister Toshiki Kaifu intervened to make the final decision "in consideration of overall
Japan-U.S. relations."58
The U.S. and Japan signed the 1991 Major Projects Arrangements Agreement (MPA)
on July 31, 199 1 9 The MPA adds seventeen government approved projects and six
planned projects to the 1988 MPA, worth an estimated 26.7 billion dollars over the next ten
49. Japan: Construction Ministry Imposing New Measures Aimed at Banning Bid-Rigging in Public
Works, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 64 (1990).
50. Japan: Murkowski Likely to Drop Construction Amendment if Talks a Success, Aide Says, 7 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1295 (1990). The 1990 amendment was identical to the Brooks-Murkowski Amendment,
which was implemented in 1988 and served as a catalyst for the formation of the 1988 MPA. Id.
51. Id. The Japanese contractor's (Niigata) bid was some 20 million dollars less that AEG's bid of 53
million dollars. I, This indicated to AEG that Niigata was dumping (buying the job for well under what it can
be done for in reality). 1,4 Therefore, AEG argued that Niigata should have been disqualified because their bid
was too low to perform the contract and they had no experience in people-mover construction. Id.
52. Id In fact, Murkowski was expected to drop the amendment if the present negotiations regarding the
review and revision of the 1988 MPA were successful. Id
53. Japan: Japan, U.S. Agree to Hold Another Meeting on Dispute Over Public Works Construction, 8
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 276 (1991) [hereinafler Public Works].
54. Id
55. Id U.S. officials stated that they would not rest until the entire Japanese construction market was
open to U.S. firn participation, but Japanese officials categorically rejected expanding the agreement to include
a completely open market, even though that is exactly what the Japanese enjoy in America. Id; Japan Talks,
supra note 2, at 504.
56. Public Works, supra note 53, at 276. A more transparent bidding system, possibly without a
prequalified bidders list, would make it very difficult, if not impossible, for Japanese contractors to engage in
bid-rigging and blackballing of subcontractors. Id
57. Japan: Construction Negotiations Go Down to Wire as Japan Agrees to Open More Public Projects,
8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 846 (1991).
58. Id
59. New Agreement, supra note 12, at 1171. The MPA was signed by U.S. Commerce Secretary Robert
A. Mosbacher and Japzn's Ambassador Ryohei Murata. Id
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to fifteen years.6° Additionally, the MPA provides for greater transparency in Japanese
bidding procedures, a simplified ranking system for designating potential bidders, and a
procurement review board to handle complaints.61 Further, the MPA was subject to review
after one year,62 whereby section 301 sanctions could still be initiated if the USTR felt that
Japan was still discriminating against U.S. construction companies.'
3
In early 1992, USTR officials stated that gains under the MPA had been marginal."
Consequently, the U.S. is seeking to add thirty-five projects to the MPA in an effort to make
it easier for U.S. firms to win Japanese public construction contracts.65 Those projects, if
included in the MPA, would be subject to the MPA's more transparent bidding procedures.
Japan's position is that the purpose of the MPA is to give U.S. firms a chance to familiarize
themselves with the Japanese construction industry and that after this initial period, the MPA
will no longer be necessary because U.S. firms will then be established in Japan. 66
However, U.S. officials believe that without serious changes in Japan's current construction
law, U.S. contractors would be completely shut out of the Japanese construction market if
the MPA is not maintained in full and continuous force.67
I. THE GOALS AND PURPOSES OF THE MPA
A. Japan's Construction Market and the Need for the MPA
In order to understand the MPA, it is vital to be aware of the construction practices in
Japan which created its closed construction market.68 U.S. interest in the Japanese
construction industry has been heightened by the huge trade surplus that Japan has had in
recent years.69 As a result, the U.S. Department of Commerce began negotiating with the
Japanese in an effort to break down the barriers caused by their closed construction
industry.70 In particular, U.S. officials'wanted Japan to ease its licensing requirements and
create a more transparent bidding system,7 1 which would foster a more competitive
60. Id
61. Id The MPA also adds a new "track IV" for procurement of design and consulting services, in
addition to the three tracks already covered: Track I, procurement of goods; track II, procurement of construction
services; and track III, procurement of architectural design and consulting services. Id
62. Id U.S. Commerce Secretary Mosbacher stated that "[a]nything short of [a completely open Japanese
public construction market] is disappointing, but the [MPA] is a very large step in that direction... ." Further,
he added that "[w]e will not be satisfied until [Japan's public construction market] is completely open just as
our public procurement is <open> in this country to Japanese or any foreign firm." Id.
63. Id
64. Japan: U.S. Seeks Access, supra note 5, at 1377.
65. Id
66. Id at 1377-78.
67. Telephone Interview with Jack Randolph, International Construction Industry Expert, U.S. Department
of Commerce (Feb. 4, 1993) [hereinafter Randolph Interview]. This point is further supported by the fact that
U.S. contractors who are trying to participate in projects which are not designated under the MPA are being
barred by the commissioning entities solely for that reason. Id
68. LEVY, supra note 6, at 388.
69. Id
70. Id
71. KRAUSS, supra note 6, at 5. By creating a more transparent bidding system which precludes bid-
rigging, U.S. contractors will be able to bid on equal footing with established Japanese contractors, and thereby
have an equal opportunity to be awarded contracts.
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atmosphere and give U.S. contractors an opportunity to be awarded construction
contracts.72 Although a detailed discussion regarding the Japanese construction industry
is beyond the scope of this Comment, a brief description of the Japanese construction
procurement system is necessary to illustrate how U.S. and foreign contractors have been
shut out of Japan's construction market.73
Prior to the MPA, foreign contractors attempting to procure a construction license in
Japan faced formidable obstacles.74 In particular, contractors had to show "the ownership
of a minimum amount of property and the employment of a minimum number of qualified
engineers in Japan."75 Further, contractors had to show past experience on similar projects,
as well as prove that their engineers were not only Japanese but had achieved a certain level
of expertise and-experience.7 6 These requirements proved to be overly burdensome to U.S.
contractors. 7
Even if U.S. contractors could obtain a construction license, they would still have to be
prequalified to bid.78 Under Japan's bidding law, the Ministry of Construction ranks
contractors in order to determine projects in which they would be qualified to participate.79
A contractor's experience is of primary importance in obtaining a good ranking, and, until
recently, only experience in Japan counted towards a contractor's ranking." Although new
Japanese contractors could obtain adequate rankings for small projects, such projects were
financially impossible for large U.S. contractors to undertake."' Consequently, it proved
to be a true catch-22 for foreign contractors in Japan, because in order to be ranked high
enough to qualify for a large project, large project experience in Japan was needed, and in
order to gain large project experience in Japan, a high ranking was necessary.82 This
ranking system effectively acted as a complete bar to large U.S. contractors.83
While this system of prequalification appears to result in a simplified bidding process,
.in practice, "it has permitted the practice of collusive bidding, pre-bid consultation and price
72. New Agreement, supra note 12, at 1171.
73. For a more detailed description of Japan's construction practices, see LEvY, supra note 6 passin;
HASEGAWA & THE SitMIzu GROUP FS, supra note 3, at 195; KAREL VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF
JAPANESE PowER 114-20 (1989); David L. Richter, Legal Barriers to U.S. Firm Participation in the Japanese
Construction Industry, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 755, 760 (1991).
74. Richter, supra note 73, at 760.
75. HASEGAWA & THE SHtMizu GROUP FS, supra note 3, at 6.
76. LEvY, supra note 6, at 70.
77. See Japan: Top Japanese Construction Official Says U.S. Firms Must Work Harder to Tap Market,
5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 162 (1988) [hereinafter Top Market]. U.S. officials felt that given the amount of
subjectivity in the Japanese licensing system, even if a U.S. contractor could obtain the requisite qualified
engineers, the Japanese official would simply hold that the contractor did not have sufficient experience to
warrant the award of a construction license. Id. In fact, one industry spokesman believed that the Japanese
bidding system was a catch-22 because, regardless of the laws, if a construction company did not have
experience in Japan, a license would not be issued. Id.
78. LEVY, supro note 6, at 71-72.
79. Richter, supra note 73, at 762.
80. Ia See LEvY, supra note 6, at 72. Additional factors Japan considers in ranking contractors include:
annual sales volume of similar projects; number of employees in the company; owned capital; ratio of current
assets to current liabilities; ratio of fixed assets to capital; ratio of net profit to total liabilities and net worth;
number of years in business; work history; safety record; and record of labor relations. Id.
81. See KRAuss, supra note 6, at 3-6 (discussing the Japanese bidding system in general).
82. Richter, supra note 73, at 762.
83. Japan: Latest Japanese Offer To Open Construction Markets Rejected By U.S. Officials In Tokyo,
5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 234 (1988).
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adjustment between the fraternity of large contractors on the invited bidders list." 4 This
system of bid-rigging and collusion is known as Dango.85 U.S. officials contend that the
Japanese bidding system must become more transparent 6 in order for foreign contractors
to have a fair opportunity to successfully bid on Japanese construction projects.8 7
The combination of these aspects of the vast and rich Japanese construction system
resulted in a construction market which was closed to U.S. contractors.88 This conflict
formed the basis of negotiations between U.S. and Japanese officials.89 The goal of the
U.S. was to have Japan adopt a nondiscriminatory procurement policy for all public works
projects performed in Japan.9"
B. Policies of the MPA
Part I of the MPA sets forth certain policies to be followed by both the U.S. and
Japanese governments in an effort to implement and improve upon the MPA.9 ' In
particular, the government of Japan promises to "maintain open, transparent, competitive and
nondiscriminatory procedures in the procurement of public works, and to treat foreign firms
no less favorably than domestic firms, including providing information in a
nondiscriminatory manner."92 Further, the government of Japan will "welcome foreign
firms into the Japanese market and will.., undertake positive steps to promote and facilitate
the entry of foreign firms into the Japanese construction market."93
With respect to continued improvement of the Japanese procurement system, the
Japanese Government is committed to ongoing negotiations with the private construction
industry in Japan in an effort to develop a uniform system of procurement that will "further
enhance and facilitate international competition in Japan's construction market."94 In fact,
Japan is currently involved in discussions in the GATT, "which are aimed at formulating
international rules concerning the procurement system for public works, that would serve as
the basis for reforms of national procurement sygtems of the GATT contracting parties."95
84. LEVY, supra note 6, at 72-73. The invited bidders list is a list of contractors that have been approved
by a commissioning agency to bid on a particular project. /d
85. Id at 195-96. Dango is a system in which the prequalified bidders consult among themselves and
determine whose turn it is to win the contract. Id Additionally, an appropriate political individual was given a
large kickback to ensure the continuance of the illegal process. Id Although Dango is illegal under Japan's anti-
monoply law, it is an acknowledged practice that many consider a leveling device to keep the market forces in
check. Id However, this practice is deadly to foreign contractors who are locked out of the fraternity. Id
86. In the U.S., there is no prequalified bidders list on public projects. Therefore, there is no opportunity
for bidders to get together and determine who is going to win the next bid, or pool in money to pay a
government official to ensure that the intended contractor is awarded the project.
87. Top Market, supra note 77, at 162.
88. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (discussing Japan's closed construction industry).
89. LEVY, supra note 6, at 388-98.
90. IX
91. MPA, supra note 1, app. II, pt. I, § L
92. Id
93. Id
94. Icd app. H, pt. I, § I. It is clear in the statement of policies, although the agreement is bilateral in
nature, that it is the intent of the parties to have the MPA apply to all foreign contractors, not just U.S.
contractors. Ra
95. Id app. H, pt. I, § IV.
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One recent article advanced that the GATT negotiations have made considerable progress
in encouraging international trade in services.
6
The government of Japan will also strive to eliminate bid-rigging from their construction
industry.97 In particular, Japanese officials will strictly enforce the provisions of the
Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Maintenance Act (Antimonopoly Act).98 Further, the MPA
sets out specific provisions for dealing with the problem of Dango." The success of the
MPA depends upon the good-faith implementation of these policies.
C. Specific Provisions of the MPA
1. Construction Tracks
Because construction procurement contracts come in many forms, the MPA established
four "tracks" in order to implement specific regulations when necessary. Track I specifies
special measures' for the procurement of goods.' Track II specifies special measures
for the procurement of construction services."' Track III specifies special measures for
procurement of design and consulting services. 3 Track IV specifies special measures for
procurement of a combination of design and consulting services with the supply,
manufacturing andor installation of goods.' 4 Additionally, track I and track IV will be
implemented in conjunction with the GATT Agreement on Government Procurement of
Goods.'05
The primary purpose of the special measures is to specify certain administrative
requirements which apply to each track. 0 6 Requirements include particular procurement
procedures, such as where information can be found regarding the procurement of a
particular project, 'the time period between notice and bidding, notification of designated
participants, how and when bidding will be initiated and the contract will be awarded, and
any special meetings that are required to explain preliminary specifications for
construction."'
96. Russel Watson et al.,An 'October Surprise'?, NEWSWEEK, October 26, 1992, at 47. The implication
is that a government procurement code for services would be established that is similar in purpose and effect
to the government procurement code for goods. Id.
97. MPA, supra note 1, app. II, pt. I, § V.
98. Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Maintenance Act, Law No. 54 (1947) (Japan). The purpose of the
Antimonopoly Act is to prevent undue restraint of trade and unfair business practices, thereby promoting free
and fair competition in. business activities. 3 DoINO BUsINESS IN JAPAN § 6.0414][b] (Zentaro Kitagana ed.,
1990). While the Antimonopoly Act addresses some of the same concerns as the MPA, due to corrupt practices,
it has rarely been eriforced. Id Dango is covered by the Antimonopoly Act. l § 6.04(4][b][i]. The Japan Fair
Trade Commission enforces the Antimonopoly Act through various measures such as cease and desist orders
or divestment of business privileges. Id.
99. MPA, supra note 1, annex A, Measures to Prevent Bid-Rigging.
100. See generah. id app. II, pt. II, § VI()-(4) (discussing tracks I-IV generally). The special measures
refer to rules which are specific to a certain track. Id Because there are slight differences in each track, some
special rules were necessary. Id
101. Id app. II, pt. 1I, § VI(1).
102. Id app. H, pt. II, § VI(2).
103. Id app. II, pt. I, § VI(3).
104. Id. app. I, pt. II, § VI(4).
105. Id app. II, pt. , § VI(1).
106. Id app. H, pt. II, § VI(1)-(4).
107. Id
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2. Licensing
Under the MPA, contractors, architects, and engineers must be licensed by the Ministry
of Construction before engaging in any procurement process in Japan.1"8 However,
contracting parties do not need a license in order to provide consulting services or to supply
goods."° Prior to the MPA, obtaining a construction license was one of the most difficult
hurdles to entering the Japanese construction market.11
The most important change in Japan's licensing requirements is that contractors no
longer need prior experience in Japan."' Further, "[o]n receiving applications for
authorization of foreign managerial and technical qualifications and/or experience, the
Ministry of Construction will assess the foreign qualifications and/or experience on an
individual basis .... [and] there will be no unfavorable treatment for foreign qualifications
or experience."' 12 Additionally, "foreign companies will be given no less advantageous
treatment than Japanese companies except for the period necessary for authorization
processing."' 3 The processing period for foreign companies will be two to four months
for licenses issued by the Ministry of Construction and one to two months for licenses issued
by a Perfectural Governor." 4 If a company does not receive its license after ninety days
from the date the application was submitted, the company may request and receive an
explanation from the Ministry of Construction." '
3. Ranking Contractors
Once a construction company obtains a license, the MPA still requires that it obtain a
sufficiently high ranking to bid on large public works projects." 6 This has proven to be
very difficult for foreign contractors who have little or no experience in the Japanese
construction market." 7 In response to this problem, the MPA provides that "[i]n
evaluating a foreign firm for purposes of ranking.... commissioning entities will treat the
results of an inquiry into the firm's experience and technical competence acquired in a
foreign country as equivalent to experience and technical competence acquired in
Japan.""' In addition, the MPA sets forth a comprehensive list of factors which are used
by commissioning entities in ranking companies, as well as formulas to determine the weight
that each factor is allocated." 9
108. Id; Special Brief on MPA (Draft No. 2, Feb. 10, 1992), U.S. Department of Commerce, at 3-19
[hereinafter Special Brief on MPA].
109. Id
110. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing pre-MPA licensing requirements in Japan).
111. MPA, supra note 1, app. II, pt. II, § X(5).
112. Id app. II, pt. H, § X(1).
113. Id app. II, pt. H, § X(2).
114. Id app. II, pt. H, § X(4).
115. Id
116. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text (discussing pre-MPA ranking requirements in Japan).
117. Id
118. MPA, supra note 1, app. II, pt. H1, § XI.
119. Id app. II, annex D. Factors include: (1) average annual value of completed projects in a related field;
(2) net worth; (3) number of staff members engaged in the construction business; (4) general business condition
of the company, such as profitability and liquidity; (5) number of technical staff members; (6) number of years
in business; (7) construction performance history; (8) experience in special construction; (9) safety record; and
(10) state of labor welfare. Id
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4. Measures to Prevent Bid-Rigging (Dango)
Once a company has met the requisite licensing and ranking requirements, it is still
necessary to get past the problem of collusive bidding and other illegal bid-rigging practices
which are pervasive in the Japanese construction industry.12 1 In response to such
problems, the MPA includes special measures aimed at eliminating bid-rigging in Japan.121
The measures require that increased vigilance and stiffer penalties be imposed by the
agencies 122 responsible for investigating alleged bid-rigging.2 3 Additionally, such
agencies are required to report relevant information about bid-rigging or suspected bid-
rigging to the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC).' 24 The JFTC will strictly enforce the
Antimonopoly Act'2s against all companies which have participated in illegal bid-rigging
practices.' 26
Not only will the government of Japan enforce the Antimonopoly Act more vigorously,
but it will also impose stricter penalties on violators. 7 In particular, Japan may double
designation suspensions22 and expand the geographic area that the suspension covers to
include the whole country instead of a limited area. 29 To effectively prevent bid-rigging,
the government of Japan ensures that all bidders are aware that Antimonopoly Act violations
will be vigorously prosecuted, that successful bids which result from bid-rigging will be
declared invalid, and that all bidders will be required to state that their bids were produced
in compliance with all applicable laws and not as the result of any collusive bidding
practices. 3 '
5. Complaints Mechanism
In case of disputes, the MPA includes a comprehensive complaints mechanism.'
The government of Japan established the Procurement Review Board (PRB),"' consisting
of neutral third parties "who have knowledge and experience related to public sector
procurement.""3 The PRB renders findings of fact to determine whether any of the special
120. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (discussing bid-rigging in Japan).
121. MPA, supra note 1, app. II, Annex A.
122. IM The two primary agencies responsible for implementing the measures to prevent bid-rigging are
the National Coordinating Committee for Implementation of Public Works Contracts Procedures (NCC) and the
Procurement Review Board (PRB). IM § 2.
123. Id app. II, annex A, §§ 1-2.
124. Id § 2.
125. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing the Antimonopoly Act).
126. MPA, supra note 1, app. II, annex A, § 3. The JFTC will make public any actions that are taken
against companies engaging in bid-rigging, as well as the names of the offenders, the nature of the offense, and
the surroungind circumstances. Id The JFTC may also make warnings in public. Id.
127. Id § 4.
128. Randolph Interview, supra note 67. A designation suspension occurs when a company has violated
the bid-rigging laws and its right to be designated to bid on projects has consequently been rejected. Id.
129. MPA, supra note 1, app. II, annex A, § 4.
130. Id app. II, annex A, § 5.
131. Id app. II, pt. II, § VII. The MPA negotiators consider the complaints mechanism vital to secure fair
and open competition and to ensure compliance with the terms of the agreement. Id § 1.
132. Id app. II, pt. II, § VII(2).
133. Id No member of the PRB will participate in the review process if there exists a conflict of interest
between said member and a party in the complaint. Id
134. Id
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measures are violated.135 In the case of a pre-award complaint, 136 the PRB may require
that the procurement process be suspended until the resolution of the complaint.'37 In the
case of a post-award complaint, 138 the PRB may require that the contract performance be
suspended pending the resolution of the complaint. 139 In either case, the commissioning
agency140 must comply with the suspension requirement unless "urgent and compelling
circumstances" exist, in which case the commissioning entity will inform the PRB in writing
why it cannot comply with its request.1 4 ' If the PRB finds in favor of the complaining
party, it will recommend.a remedy 42 to the appropriate enforcement authority. 43
The complaints mechanism has never been utilized by a contractor to settle a grievance
under the MPA. 4" However, a similar complaints mechanism is contained in the U.S.-
Japan 1987 Supercomputer Agreement, 145 which is currently being utilized by one U.S.
firm. 46 Although the initial result of this action was not in favor of the U.S. firm, the
review process appeared to be neutral and detached. 47 Ultimately, U.S. contractors must
utilize the MPA complaints mechanism to determine whether the PRB will act as a neutral
third party, and whether the complaints mechanism is a useful deterrent against Japan's
collusive bidding practices.' 4'
IV. THE LEGALITY OF THE MPA
The MPA should be distinguished from other voluntary export restraints' 49 between
the U.S. and Japan over the past decade, in which Japanese exporters unilaterally and
independently imposed export quotas on themselves.15 Typically, voluntary export
restraints are not supported by any formal agreement between the U.S. and Japan, even
135. Id.
136. Randolph Interview, supra note 67. A pre-award complaint is one that is filed alleging illegal bid-
rigging practices before the contract has been awarded. I,
137. MPA, supra note 1, app. II, pt. II, § VII(4).
138. Randolph Interview, supra note 67. A post-award complaint alleges illegal bid-rigging practices and
is filed after the contract has been awarded. Id
139. MPA, supra note 1, app. II, pt. II, § VII(4).
140. Randolph Interview, supra note 67. The commissioning agency is in charge of procuring the particular
project in question. Id. Examples of commissioning agencies include the Corps of Engineers and state
governments. Id
141. MPA, supra note 1, app. II, pt. II, § VII(4).
142. 1d app. II, pt. II, § VII(5). Examples of recommendations include: issuing a new solicitation package;
seeking new bids; re-evaluating offers; awarding the contract to another party; or terminating the contract. Id.
143. Id.
144. Telephone Interview with Jean Heilman Grier, Senior Counsel for Trade Agreements, U.S.
Department of Commerce (Feb. 4, 1993) [hereinafter Grier Interview].
145. Supercomputer Agreement (Aug. 7, 1987) (on file with the U.S. Department of Commerce, Office
of General Counsel).
146. Grier Interview, supra note 144.
147. Id. The use of the complaints mechanism in the Supercomputer Agreement has given U.S. officials
an opportunity to gauge the complaint mechanism's effectiveness. IdL
148. Id.
149. See Kojo Yelpaala, The Lomd Conventions and the Political Economy of the African-Caribbean-
Pacific Countries: A CriticalAnalysis of the Trade Provisions, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 807, 842-45 (1981)
(discussing voluntary export restraints). See also 6 ANDREAS F. LowENFELD, PUBLIC CoNTRoLs ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 195-251 (1983) (discussing voluntary restraints generally).
150. See Yelpaala, supra note 149, at 845 (noting that voluntary export restraints are some of the most
important and commonly used nontariff restrictions).
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though the basis for the action may be the result of U.S. pressure."' Therefore, it could
be argued that there was no agreement at all but merely unilateral action by Japan.
152
In the case of the MPA, there is little doubt that there are at least two parties to the
agreement, the U.S. and Japan. Although one cannot immediately conclude that the MPA
is an agreement, the use of the phraseology "acceptable to our two governments," 53 "[t]he
Government of Japan will implement the measures,"154 and "[t]he adjustments.., will
enable our governments to resolve procedural questions"155 is merely a camouflage of what
actually took place between the U.S. and Japan.
The U.S. and Japan recognized that there was no international agreement on
construction procurement and, therefore, negotiated a bilateral agreement to apply to Japan's
closed construction market. 56 The language of the arrangement and correspondence
between the U.S. and Japan strongly suggest that the parties intended to agree on establishing
a procedure to deal with government procurement problems in the Japanese construction
industry. Therefore, it would appear that not withstanding the absence of the use of the word
"agreement," the M]?A is nothing short of an international agreement between the U.S. and
Japan.
Although the MPA was not entered into with the usual formalities of a treaty, the
legality of the agreement between the U.S. and Japan cannot hinge on the finding that it is
a treaty. It is a contract, pure and simple, and like every contract its legality or binding effect
depends upon the intrentions of the parties. Everything surrounding the MPA suggests that
the parties intended for it to be legally binding.15 This is further borne out by the fact that
the MPA contains a complaints mechanism by which grievances can be addressed.'58
The incorporation of a complaints mechanism into the MPA indicates that both the U.S.
and Japan intend for the MPA to be a legally binding agreement. The PRB is comprised of
Japanese officials. Although there is no reason to believe that the PRB will not act as a fair
and neutral body, there is a fear that, if faced with conflicting U.S. and Japanese interests,
the PRB may have difficulty acting as a truly disinterested review board. In fact, some
would consider the PRB an interested body by definition, and incapable of acting neutrally
when U.S. interests compete with Japanese interests. Further, in the event that an American
contractor becomes disgruntled with the outcome of an action, because of the belief that the
PRB ruled against him based on the Japanese interest involved, what remedies are left which
will not threaten the integrity and existence of the MPA itself?
151. Id at 844-45. Exporting countries unilaterally impose voluntary export restraints upon themselves to
avoid the implementation of trade sanctions by importing countries. Id. See JOHN H. JACKSON & WILIAM J.
DAvEY, LEGAL PROBLEdS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 609-22 (1986) (discussing voluntary
restraints generally).
152. See Malcolm D.H. Smith, Voluntary Export Quotas and U.S. Trade Policy-A New Nontariff
Barrier?, 5 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 10 (1973) (discussing the affect of voluntary export restraints).
153. Letter from Ryohei Murata, Ambassador of Japan, to Robert A. Mosbacher, Secretary of Commerce
(July 31, 1991) (on file with the U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of General Counsel) [hereinafter Murata
Letter].
154. Id
155. Letter from Robert A. Mosbacher, Secretary of Commerce, to Ryohei Murata, Ambassador of Japan
(July 31, 1991) (on file "Mth the U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of General Counsel).
156. Murata Letter, supra note 153.
157. See supra notes 18-67 and accompanying text (discussing the development of the MPA).
158. See supra notes 131-48 and accompanying text (discussing the complaints mechanism).
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As the WPA is written, there is no appeals process whereby an unsatisfied claimant can
seek review of a PRB decision. The only tool available to U.S. contractors at this point is
the threat of section 301 sanctions, 59 but only U.S. officials have the authority to exercise
such action. However, section 301 is only a threat, and as such, it places the existence of the
MPA at risk because it creates confusion as to how the problem will ultimately be resolved.
In an effort to make the MPA legally binding without risking the agreement itself, the
U.S. and Japan should add a second layer to the complaints mechanism. The appeals process
should allow a party who is unsatisfied with the ruling of the PRB to appeal to an
international board of arbitrators located in a neutral country and made up of construction
experts and attorneys from neutral countries. This system would guarantee disinterested
review of challenged decisions under the PRB, which will not be subject to attack on the
basis that the ruling authority has an interest in the outcome of the action.
V. MPA AS A BASIS FOR A MULTILATERAL
AGREEMENT UNDER THE GATT
Incorporating the policies of the MPA into a multilateral agreement within the
international community would be the ultimate result of U.S. negotiations with Japan.
1 61
Although the MPA is written in neutral language to support its adoption by other
nations, 61 U.S. officials cannot negotiate on behalf of other nations without their
involvement.'62 Consequently, it is crucial to the forwarding of a multilateral construction
procurement agreement that all nations within the international construction community
actively negotiate with Japan. Such an agreement should not only focus on Japan becoming
an open market, but on opening the markets of other countries as well. Undx tie PA,
the government of Japan will pursue multilateral discussions in the GATT aimed at
formulating international rules which will govern the national procurement systems of the
GATT contracting parties. 6 ' In fact, pursuant to the policies of the MPA, the GATT
Government Procurement of Goods Code (GPGC)'6' has been incorporated into tracks I
and IV of the MPA, which involve the procurement of construction goods. 65 If combined,
the MPA and the GPGC could serve as a model for developing a GATT code which covers
the government procurement of both construction goods and services.
GATT officials have criticized Japan for its involvement in bilateral agreements, such
as the MPA, despite Japan's stated support for multilateral agreements. 166 GATT officials
argue that Japan should become more active in pursuing multilateral agreements under the
GATT for its own benefit, "including long-run economic competitiveness," instead of
remedying trade imbalances with individual countries through bilateral agreements. 67
159. See supra note 28 (discussing section 301).
160. Randolph Interview, supra note 67.
161. See supra note 91-99 and accompanying text (discussing the policies of the MPA).
162. Randolph Interview, supra note 67.
163. MPA, supra note 1, app. 11, pt. I, § IV.
164. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Multilateral Negotiations: Agreement on Government
Procurement, April 11, 1979,55 U.N.T.S. 187. The GPGC governs the procurement of goods between member
nations. Id. It does not regulate the procurement of services. Id
165. See Grier, supra note 28, at 29-30 (discussing the role of GAIT in the MPA).
166. Japan Plays Bilateral Game Behind Multilateral Mask, FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 14, 1992, at 8.
167. Id
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Japan's involvement in bilateral agreements creates the impression in the global economic
community that Japan is not willing to become a true player in the inevitable globalization
of the economic arena."" As a result, Japan's reputation could be seriously hampered in
the future as the global economic community becomes more of a reality.'6 9
During recent GATT trade talks, Japan showed interest in pursuing the development of
multilateral agreements in service industries 170 such as construction.' GATT
negotiators are hopeful that Japan's recent interest will trigger progress in the area of
government procurement. 7 2 The MPA and GPGC could serve as a valuable starting point
for a multilateral agreement covering construction procurement in today's global
construction industry.
VI. CONCLUSION
The MPA has made significant progress in opening up Japan's historically closed
construction market to U.S. and other foreign contractors. In fact, since July of 1991, thirty-
two U.S. companies had construction business licenses in Japan and eight U.S. design firms
had registered as First Class Architect Firms.' Increased and continuous negotiating by
U.S. officials has resulted in less stringent licensing requirements, as well as more
transparent bidding procedures. However, U.S. officials are not satisfied that Japan's
construction market is sufficiently open. 174 U.S. officials will continue to work towards
creating a completely open Japanese construction market for U.S. contractors, just as
Japanese contractors enjoy in America. ' However, the entire Japanese construction
industry, which has developed primarily since World War II, cannot be expected to
transform to meet U.S. needs overnight.
176
In the meantime, it is necessary that both U.S. and other foreign officials continue to
exert pressure on the Japanese Government in an effort to ensure that a completely open
Japanese construction market is realized one day.' The benefits of pursuing a multilateral
agreement with Japan, which follows the guidelines set forth in the MPA, are too great to
ignore. Such an agreement would make great strides towards a global construction market,
which would benefit all countries involved.
R. Allen Ennis, Jr.
168. Id
169. See id (discussing the ramifications of Japan's attitude towards bilateral and multilateral agrcements).
170. Eastern Promise on GA7T, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Jan. 1993, at 3.
171. GATT: Japan Proposes Measures on Services to Help Conclude Uruguay Round Talks, 10 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 15 (1993).
172. GAT1" GATINegotiators Focus on Market Access in an Attempt to Reach a Breakthrough, 10 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 51 (1991).
173. MPA, supra note 1, app. I.
174. Telephone Interview with Jack Randolph, International Construction Industry Expert, U.S. Department
of Commerce (Jan. 14, 1993).
175. Id
176. Richter, supra note 73, at 775.
177. Id
